The topic of this paper is the rôle-based trust-management language 7 ) 8 @ 9 , a formalism inspired by logic programming that handles trust in large scale, decentralised systems. We provide a purely operational semantics for the language in which credentials can be established using a simple set of inference rules. We then extend 7 ) 8 @ 9 to include time validity and boolean guards that control the availability of credentials. In such an extended framework, credentials are conditional on the availability of supporting credentials in the execution context. In addition to a set-theoretic and a logicprogramming semantics, we develop for the extended language a series of increasingly powerful inference systems for establishing these conditional credentials. By means of simple but realistic examples, we demonstrate the expressiveness and usability of our language, warranting its integration into existing trust-management tools.
Introduction
One of the current challenges in computer science is the development of theoretically-based and practically-implementable approaches to access control and authorisation in large-scale, distributed systems. Such problems arise, for example, when independent users or organisations collaborate to achieve common goals, since collaborations are highly dynamic and usually heterogeneous: membership, resources and policies vary in time and are usually locally controlled by each collaborating principal; normally no form of centralisation exists.
Trust-management [6] is an approach to distributed access control where decisions are based on policy statements made by multiple principals. A key aspect of trust-management is delegation: a principal may transfer limited authority on one or more resources to other principals. Usually, this is done by means of credentials, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. PPDP'06 July 10-12, 2006 i.e. pieces of information, passed from one principal to another and used to establish the sending principal's access rights. A chain of one or more credentials acts as a capability, granting permissions to principals.
Traditionally, access control takes decisions by relying on the identity of the resource requester. Unfortunately, when resource owner and requester are unknown to each other, such a form of access control does not work. For this reason, in [20] trustmanagement has been integrated with rôle-based access control (RBAC) [27] . RBAC is a policy-neutral access control technology, whose flexibility and expressiveness arise from the notion of rôle, interposed in the assignment of permissions to users. Users are authorised to use the permissions assigned to the rôles they belong to; thus, in contrast with traditional access control mechanisms, RBAC regulates access to resources on the basis of the activities users execute in the system, and not on their identity.
A Rôle-based Trust-Management Language. 7 ) 8 is a family of rôle-based trust-management languages able to express statements on policies in a succinct and intuitive way. It is inspired by trustmanagement languages such as SPKI/SDSI [9, 8] and includes basic operations to perform complex forms of delegation.
) 8 B 9
is the most basic language of the family; it is the "core" language, in that it only includes the key aspects of 7 ) 8 and ignores programming features, such as data types or constraints, whose only aim is to make the task of programming more flexible.
We present the key features of 7 ) 8 B 9 via the following simple example. EXAMPLE 1. An auditor can inspect an enterprise only if he is a member of a society authorised by the government. In the UK, auditing societies are chosen among those which are legally registered and fair. Assuming that B is a member of a society BSoc that is both legally registered and fair for the UK standards, then C can become an auditor for an enterprise Ent. This scenario can be modelled by the following 7 ) 8 @ 9 are presented in [22, 20] : in the first paper, the semantics of a set of 7 ) 8 B 9 -credentials is given via a set-theoretic interpretation; this resembles a denotational semantics and is explicitly based on a fixpoint construction. In the second paper, the semantics is given indirectly: 7 ) 8 B 9 credentials are translated into a logic program and their semantics is obtained as the minimal Herbrand model of the translation. The main intention of this second approach is to provide an implementation of credential resolution.
The first contribution of our paper is a purely operational interpretation of 7 ) 8 @ 9 credentials; we give a simple set of inference rules for deriving credentials from a set of 7 ) 8 B 9
statements. This inference system is an explicit formalisation of the intuitive meaning of 7 ) 8 @ 9 statements and provides a convenient way of working with them. The judgements of the inference system take the form
£ ¤
, where £ is a set of 7 ) 8 @ 9 credentials and ¤ is a 7 ) 8 @ 9 -credential. Thus, in the context of Example 1, we will be able to derive that
¥ (1)¦ (2)¦ (3)¦ (4)¦ (5)¦ (6) §
Ent.auditor
is intended as a model for real-life trust management; it is therefore desirable to extend it with realistic features, while preserving its nature of "core" formalism. The main contribution of this paper is in this direction: we add time validity and (possibly negative) boolean conditions to limit the use of 7 ) 8 B 9 -credentials. We call the resulting formalism context-dependent credentials (CDCs, for short), since the availability of a 7 ) 8 B 9
-credential now depends on the context where it is exhibited, that is the time of evaluation and the information inferable from other credentials available in the execution context.
Context-dependent credentials, informally. Example 1 can be made more realistic by including timing information; indeed, several authors advocate credentials that are valid only for some fixed periods of time (see, e.g., [28, 23, 26] ). In our auditing scenario, it is quite natural to assume that B is a member of BSoc only for a fixed period of time, say© ; moreover, UK's fairness certificates are usually valid only for a period of time, say ; finally, BSoc becomes a legal society only after its registration that happens, say, at time . Thus, credentials (4), (5) and (6) should be generalised to
stating that (4), (5) and (6) are only available after , during and during© , respectively. On the other hand, credentials (1), (2) and (3) are always valid, as they express some time-independent facts. Now, by using (1), (2), (3), (7), (8) and (9), we want to be able to derive that B can be an auditor for Ent during all of the period
Another powerful feature which would be useful to model more realistic policies is the ability to parameterise the validity of a credential on the the availability/non-availability of other credentials in the execution context. This can be useful to enforce, e.g., mutual exclusion or separation of duties. These principles are easy to implement in RBAC [12] 
The presence of negative premises makes the theory of CDCs considerably more complex than that of 7 ) 8 B 9
. We avoid potential inconsistencies by following the well-known path put forward by the stable model semantics [14] ; using this technique we extend the standard semantics of 7 ) 8 B 9
by providing both a set-theoretic semantics for CDCs and a translation into logic programming. We then adapt our inference system for 7 ) 8 B 9
to CDCs; as with 7 ) 8 @ 9 , we believe that this approach gives a very intuitive interpretation to CDCs. However, since the inference system has negative premises, we have to be careful to avoid the same unfoundedness problems present in the logic programming and in the set theoretic approach. Following the ideas in [7] , we define an inference system allowing negative premises by following the construction of stable models for general logic programs (i.e., logic programs with negative atoms). Then because the same construction is used in all the three semantics for CDCs, we can claim and prove that all these approaches do coincide.
The extended inference system now relies on judgements of the form 
. On the other hand, it will not be possible to derive Ent.auditor ; otherwise credential (13) cannot be used because credential (14) states that Alice is a permanently active worker. In this latter case, we can only rely on a context providing a credential set that permits to directly infer
Finally, we also discuss the close correspondence between our enhanced inference systems for inferring CDCs and abductive logic programming [16] . This is a variant of logic programming which, given a logic program (corresponding, in our case, to a set of CDCs) and a goal (corresponding, in our case, to the privilege desired), returns the minimal set of facts (corresponding, in our case, to the execution context) enabling the derivation of the goal.
Structure of the paper. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall some elements from the theory of logic programming, since, as we have already mentioned, several constructions are taken from this field. In Section 3 we briefly recall 7 ) 8 B 9 and its two known semantics, namely the set-theoretic and the logicprogramming one. Then, we present our inference system and state its equivalence with respect to the previous two semantics. In Section 4 we present CDCs and their set-theoretic, logic-programming and inference system semantics. In Section 5 we present the enhanced inference systems for CDCs and their abductive logic programming counterpart. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude the paper by touching upon related work. Due to space limitations, some proofs are omitted and can be found in a technical report [15] .
Elements of Logic Programming
We briefly recall the main definitions from the field of logic programming used in the paper. For the sake of simplicity, several definitions will be tailored to our needs; for a full presentation, see [2, 4] .
We assume three numerable and pair-wise disjoint sets: variables, ranged over by The semantics of a general logic program is given by its models. A model is a triple formed by a nonempty set B , called universe, and two functions that associate an element of the universe to each constant of the language and a subset of
to each relation of the language, respectively; moreover, such associations must respect the logical constraints imposed by the program clauses. The canonical model of a program is usually chosen among its Herbrand models. These are models whose universe is the set of constants of the language and whose constants are interpreted by the identity function. A Herbrand model is completely determined by the ground atoms that are true in it; we shall usually identify it with the set of these atoms. A Herbrand model is minimal if no proper subset of it is a Herbrand model of the program.
The semantics of a logic program (without negations)
A is given by means of its minimal Herbrand model, written
, that always exists and is unique [30] . However, for general logic programs the Herbrand model may not be unique or may not even exist at all. Problems arise in programs such as itself. Several proposals have been appeared in literature to give a semantics to general logic programs. However, as clearly stated in [14] , "researchers seem to agree that there can be no useful definition of canonical models for arbitrary programs." Among all the available proposals, one of the most general and intuitive is the stable model semantics [14] . The stable model semantics is one of the most general semantics for general logic programs in the sense that it assigns a semantics to quite a large number of programs. Indeed, it has been proved [14, 4] that stable models subsume the iterated fixpoint semantics of stratified programs [3] , the well-founded semantics [31] and the perfect models of locally stratified programs [24] , while it overlaps with perfect models for programs that are not locally stratified. Moreover, it coincides with the well-supported model semantics of [11] ; this is a very reasonable semantics as it only allows to infer atoms whose 'explanation' does not rely on themselves. However, stable models still leave some programs without a semantics. For example, (17) has no semantics, as it has no stable model, whereas (18) has no semantics, as it has two different stable models (viz., 
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The Language RTC
We start by briefly recalling the language 7 ) 8 B 9
from [21] which, in turn, is a generalisation of SPKI/SDSI [9, 8] . We then present an inference system for 7 ) 8 B 9 that captures precisely the existing semantics of the language, given by both a set-theoretic interpretation and a logic programming interpretation. where function " ¡ "
Syntax.
translates every credential to a logic program clause as follows : "
Inference system. We now provide an operational semantics for 7 ) 8 @ 9 via a very intuitive inference system. The four kinds of credentials are handled by the four rules in Table 2 , where judgement £ ¤ should be read as: "using the credentials in £ , we can infer the credential ¤ ." The rules should be self-explanatory. We can now prove that the inference system provides an alternative way of presenting the semantics of 7 ) 8 B 9
. (The proof is in [15] ). 
Context-dependent credentials
We now extend 7 ) 8 @ 9 by adding boolean guards and time validity; the syntax is in 
Logic-programming semantics
As with 7 ) 8 @ 9
, we shall now give three semantics to sets of CDCs. We start with the logic-programming approach, since the subsequent constructions will be inspired by it. The semantics is calculated at a precise time instant, by only considering those CDCs that are valid at that moment. We chose the stable model semantics because, apart from being one of the most generous semantics for general logic programs (cf. Section 2), it can be seen as "the sets of belief that a rational agent might hold" [14] . Quoting from [14] : The 'rational agent' explanation of the stable model semantics given above can be readily rephrased to intuitively justify the semantics for CDCs. Indeed, if G is the entities-to-rôles assignment that should hold, then any credential whose guard contains
, is useless as its guard is not satisfied; furthermore, any guard C 2 0
Set-theoretic semantics
An alternative way to define the semantics of CDCs is to directly state which entities belong to every rôle. This can be done by adapting Definition 3.1 to the current framework. Again, to avoid inconsistencies, we shall follow the approach put forward by [14] and exploit the stable model construction. Moreover, like before, the semantics will be parameterised with the evaluation time.
In the following definition, we shall exploit two auxiliary notations; let 7 be a function mapping rôles to sets of entity names. The coincidence of these two semantics can be established via the following Lemma (whose proof is given in [15] 
Inference system
We now adapt the inference system of Table 2 to take guards and validity into account. To simplify notation, in what follows we shall equate guards up-to commutativity, associativity and idempotency of
1
, and up-to absorption of Table 4 ; it mainly extends the inference rules given in Table 2 by replacing (RT ) with (CDC ) and by considering only valid CDCs. Rule (CDC ) requires that, to use a guarded credential, all its positive guards should be inferable and none of its negative guards can be inferred. However, the latter requirement is far from being innocuous: the presence of negative premises can undermine the well-foundedness of the inference system. Moreover, as in the logic-programming framework, sets of rules of the proposed form do not necessarily define a unique relation. To deal with these problems, we slightly adapt the well-known theory developed in [7] for transition systems with negative premises.
First, notice that inference systems are usually defined via inference system specifications (as in Tables 2 and 4); these are (small) collections of rule schemata, i.e. "meta-rules" which use names as placeholders; that is, they are implicitly universally quantified. If the rule schemata have no negative premises, they uniquely determine an inference set, i.e. the set of all judgements derivable from them via a finite depth inference. More precisely, given a 'positive' inference system specification ' , we first instantiate the placeholders in ' with any possible name, thus obtaining a (possibly infinite) set of (closed) inference rules ' ; then, the inference set associated to
, the set formed by all the judgements derivable via a finite depth inference using rules from ' . With negative premises, things become more delicate, because of well-foundedness problems: the associated inference set can be defined in several ways and, according to the definition chosen, an inference system specification can determine zero, one or several inference sets. We now adapt the approach of [7] to define an inference set for the inference system specification in Table 4 .
Given Soundness and completeness of the inference system w.r.t. the two semantics presented in the previous subsections can be established as a consequence of the following Lemma (whose proof is in [15] ). 
Ent.employee
We do not believe that such a feature would radically change the theory presented in this paper; nonetheless, we leave its investigation for future research.
Deriving Contexts for Execution
Context-dependent credentials, as the name suggests, depend on the context where the credential is exhibited, namely the other credentials available and the exact time of evaluation. So it is of interest, given a set of CDCs, to determine some constraints on the execution context that enable a desired inference, whenever possible. This turns out to be fundamental in large-scale distributed systems where users have partial views of their execution context. As we have already discussed in Section 1, a context is a pair xB £ ¢ q y that defines the set of CDCs made available and the time of the evaluation. The problem we now want to solve is the following:
given a set of CDCs B (representing the credentials available to a user) and a goal ¤ , which are the assumptions that As in the previous sections, we shall follow two lines of work: firstly, we adapt the inference system of Section 4.3 to also derive constraints on the environment, both on the execution time and on the CDCs it must provide or not provide; secondly, we enhance the logic-programming semantics of Section 4.1 with features taken from the field of abductive logic programming.
Adapting the Inference System
For the sake of presentation, we shall give the inference system in two steps: we first give an inference system that calculates the maximal time validity in which a certain 7 ) 8 B 9 -credential can be inferred from a given set of CDCs; then, we give an inference system that calculates a minimal set of CDCs that must be added to the given set of CDCs to infer a certain 7 ) 8 B 9 -credential. Clearly, the two systems can be combined, but this would complicate the presentation. Moreover, a nice feature of these inference systems is that they have no negative premises; this makes it trivial to define the inference set associated with them. 
Inferring
The first requirement ensures that (TV# ) has been used as much as possible to infer the validity of ¤ . The second requirement of the Definition ensures that this property is propagated through all the inference tree. We are interested in maximal inferences since they guarantee that the¨G and¨¡ in the premise of (TV (19) states that employees of Ent that are out on a mission are still active, whereas (20) states that Alice is in mission during¨ . Now, the inference previously shown becomes (with the obvious shorthands for entity and rôle names, plus , and up-to absorption of identity elements.
The aim of propositional formulae is to characterise sets of CDCs. Formally, the satisfiability relation is defined as follows: The inference rules are in Table 6 . The key rule is (ENV ): it states that a CDC can be exploited whenever it is valid and in any context enabling the inference of its positive premises but not enabling the inference of its negative premises. However, notice that we can always trivially infer G I HP I D C if the context provides it at time ; this justifies the new rule (ENV 9 ). Also in this case, notice that
: the former coincides with the latter whenever 
Abductive Logic Programming
The inference system given in Section 4.3 provides a way to decide, given a set of CDCs, which knowledge can be derived from it; as we have proved, such an inference system closely corresponds to the stable model semantics of a general logic program originating from the set of CDCs, see Proposition 4.4. The inference systems presented in Section 5.1 extend the system of Section 4.3 by providing more information, i.e. they describe the requirements an execution context should satisfy in order to derive a given goal. It is then natural to look for a logic-programming counterpart of such inference systems.
There is an intimate correspondence between the inference systems of Section 5.1 and a variant of logic programming, called abductive logic programming (ALP) [16] . Apart from theoretical interest, such a correspondence is also of practical use, since wellestablished proof procedures [17, 13, 10] Relationship between the semantics. We now prove a correspondence result between the semantics defined by the inference system in Table 6 and the abducible explanations of Definition 5.2. To this end, we first need to convert a set of unit clauses into a set of CDCs. This is carried out by function UC-CDC ¡ "
, whose formal definition is: 
Exploiting Tools for ALP. We now show how to exploit the CIFF tool [10, 1] for ALP to automate the inference systems of Tables 5  and 6 . To this end, we first need to introduce time validity of CDCs in their translation to logic clauses; this can be achieved by exploiting constraints, that have been introduced in ALP in [18] and that can be handled by CIFF. Now, general logic clauses can have in their premises more general predicates, like tests for equality or ordering relations among values and variables of arbitrary data types, such as integers or reals. Moreover, to reduce the space search, CIFF also uses some integrity constraints (not to be confused with constraints over data types) of the form
. Intuitively, integrity constraints are used to select, among all the abducible explanations, only those which satisfy all such implications. In our framework, we shall exploit very simple integrity constraints, but more sophisticated scenarios could also be considered.
To include timing information in the translation of sets of CDCs, from now on we shall always work with ternary relations P . Clearly, to do so, we first need to remove any constant from the lefthand side of a general logic clause; this can be easily done by using a (new) variable in the definition and adding an equality constraint stating that the new variable must be equal to the old constant. For example,
! H This task can be easily carried out automatically.
2. The second technical point required by the CIFF proof procedure is to clearly distinguish predicates that are abducible from those defined by the given logic program. This is needed to ensure that all the results returned by the procedure are minimal.
To this aim, we exploit the integrity constraints and add to them (that are initially empty) the implication the resulting set of integrity constraints and let ¢ be an abducible predicate.
As a consequence, we need to translate the given goal
where here is meant to be existentially quantified. We denote with as described above. The CIFF proof procedure essentially manipulates sets of formulas that are either atoms or implications. It calculates a tree of such sets (thus called nodes) with the property that each node is obtained from its father by applying one rule to the formulas occurring in the father. There are several rules; for a precise discussion of them, see [10] . The procedure terminates when all nodes are final, i.e. they contain sets of formulas to which no more rule can be applied. A final node is successful if it does not contain contradictions; otherwise, it is called failed. The root of the tree is formed by the goal and by all the integrity constraints. The output of CIFF is a set of pairs of the form . Vice versa, in [10] it is also proved that, if all the derivations in CIFF are finite and failing, then no abducible explanation for the given input exists. 
Conclusions and Related Work
The main contribution of our work is the extensions we have proposed for introducing dynamic considerations into 7 ) 8 B 9
. The availability of CDCs is intermittent, either because their time validity can (temporarily or permanently) expire or because formerly available CDCs, required to satisfy their guards, can become (temporarily or permanently) not available. This feature reflects timed privileges [28, 23, 26] and consequently makes mechanisms to explicitly introduce/remove credentials redundant.
An important source of expressiveness of an access control model is the temporal dimension that permissions have in many real-world situations: permissions are often limited in time or may hold only for specific periods of time. Moreover, permissions can also be issued/revoked according to the context where they are calculated. Context-dependent credentials, presented in this paper, are a simple but powerful way to model both these features. 3 To save space, we have shortened Alice as , Bob as It has to be said that the temporal dimension is present in the 7 ) 8
family from its birth (see the language 7 ) 8
in [20] ). However, every form of negation has been always intentionally omitted, to keep the semantical development of the language simple. As shown in the examples throughout this paper, we believe that some policy specifications intrinsically rely on negative requirements; thus, we believe that the use of negation will have to be confronted if the goal is a highly flexible model capable of supporting the specification of complex protection requirements.
Unfortunately, the presence of negation creates problems when defining the semantics of a language. Usually, there are legal terms that either have no semantics or whose semantics is not uniquely definable. The stable model approach assigns a semantics to all those terms whose derivability does not depend on themselves as assumptions. As an example, in our framework every set of CDCs containing if C 2 0 in¨and if 6 2 0 ¡ HU then G I HP D C in¨have similar problems. However, we believe that policy specifications relying on these kinds of CDCs are 'ill-formed' and should not be considered in the implementation of actual security systems.
Finally, we want to stress the usefulness of the inference systems in Section 5.1: it is really desirable to have automatic tools that assist in the definition of security specifications. The inference systems we have presented in this paper are simple, but theoretically well-founded, aids to the definition of the proper validity of certificates, or of the contextual information required for the proper functioning of a set of certificates. This turns out to be fundamental mainly in large-scale distributed systems where users only have partial views of their execution context.
Related work.
A different approach that makes the policies defined by 7 ) 8 @ 9 -credentials dynamic is given in [29] ; this contains a security-typed imperative language whose main feature is the possibility of programming policy modifications. The main focus of the paper is on controlling information flow, but security levels are expressed by means of rôles, whose membership is made dynamic by the possibility of modifying rôle-definitions during execution. This approach embeds policy modifications for 7 ) 8 B 9 into a fullfledged programming language and exploits the resulting framework for purposes different from ours; for this reason, they take an orthogonal approach and exploit type systems to rule out unwanted information flow.
Default logic [25] is one of the pioneering work in the field of non-monotonic reasoning (an example of which is also logic programming with negation). In default logic, there are ordinary inference rules and default rules, that are triples of the form "(prerequisites, justifications, conclusion)" stating that the conclusion can be derived from the pre-requisites, provided that there is no evidence that the justifications might be false. To increase expressiveness, both pre-requisites and justifications can contain negative judgements; hence, also in default logic there are problems in giving semantics to a set of default rules: there can be zero, one or more than one possible semantics for a given set of rules. Again, like in logic programming, several choices could be taken to solve this problem, one of which strongly resembles the stable model approach. Default rules are quite similar to the rule (CDC ), where the positive premises correspond to pre-requisites and negative premises to justifications.
A somewhat related work is [5] where an access control model with periodic temporal intervals associated to authorisations is
given. An authorisation is automatically granted in the specified intervals and revoked when such intervals expire. Deductive temporal rules with periodicity are provided to derive new authorisations based on the presence or absence of other authorisations in specific periods of time. Like in our approach, possible inconsistencies deriving from negative requirements are handled by the stable models approach; however, [5] £ ¢
provides delegation of rôle activations, which can express selective use of capacities and delegation of these capacities. The semantics of all these languages is given via a translation from credentials to negationfree logic programs; thus, we do not foresee any problem in applying our enhancements of 7 ) 8 B 9
to the other members of the 7 ) 8 family.
To conclude, notice that in this paper we have only considered what in [21] is called 'membership queries', that is, our guards only test whether a given entity belongs to a given rôle or not. More sophisticated queries are considered in that paper and could be integrated in our framework; for example, two other reasonable guards could be G I HP
